Publication Details

Abstract

This paper is a contribution to the discussion on the nature of logical laws, a subject of disputation in our philosophical periodicals. The subject matteris a question which can be explicitly formulated as follows: Do logical laws speak something about the world, about reality? Answering this question — may the answer be positive or negative — the least of attention usually is dedicated to the term „speaking“. The aim of the study is to explicate the term „speaking“ and to define the different logically-semantic predicates of speaking. The elucidation of this problem is considered as necessary, but not a sufficient condition of its philosophical solution. Three types of logically-semantic predicates of speaking are introduced: 1. the predicate H (it is connected with the answer to the question: what are sentential expressions speaking about?); 2. the predicate M (what do sentential expressions say?); 3. the predicate S (what are sentential expressions speaking about and what do they say?). The definition of these predicates is relativised to the language of predicate logic of 1st order, included sentential logic, v.’hich is in an appropriate manner extended by extra-logical constants, and it is also relativised to its adequate semantical system (individuals, classes, relations, and possibly situations are taken into consideration). In defining the predicates H and S difficulties arise in connexion with molecular sentential expressions; this happens when one attaches the condition of the truth of the sentential expression containing the name of the given object. The definitions are extended also on sets of sentences and their consequences. The predicate M is defined by means of the term „proposition“. This term is understood here as being equivalent to the terms „sense“ or „intension“. In the chapter dealing with definitions of the predicates of speaking, the authors analyse the conception of sharp distinction between the logical and factual level. The results of the attempts at defining the predicates of speaking are then applied to the logical laws themselves as subsets of sentential expressions. Here the authors investigate into the logical laws formulated as tautologies, and not as rules. Particular attention is paid to the question what the domain of objects of logic is consisting of. The conclusions arrived at merely indicate different possibilities; they do not signify any definitive solution whatever.