Publication Details

Abstract

Piaget’s genetic epistemology as a natural continuation of his genetic psychology and, in a certain sense, a self-reflection of its theoretical foundations and of methodological principles enriches the stream referred to as neo-rationalistic epistemology and philosophy of science with several new aspects. His special scientific investigation, as he gradually finds out, is to a great extent actually based on those principal ideas that had been formulated and demonstrated on wide material by Bachelard and further elaborated systematically (esp. from the point-of-view of methodology) by Gonseth. However, the emphasis on the experimental aspect of the approach to knowledge and its manysided realization, further — the first-rate significance of investigating ontogenesis, the detailed eleboration of the idea of oneness of knowledge and activity not only and not in the first place in the generally theoretical plan, but especially in connection with the study of concrete problems of development of knowledge of its operative structures, mechanism etc. is of great importance for the generalization of neorationalist epistemology as well as from the thematic and methodological point-of-views. These statements are, on the one hand, at least in the basic features to concretize the generally acknowledged thesis about the connection between Piaget and neo-rationalistic epistemologists. At the same time — and this is more important — they point out the need to direct attention to a more detailed investigation of the specific features of Piaget’s contribution to this trend which is inevitable for its deeper understanding. With respect to the relevant dialectical moments of genetic epistemology and neo-rationalism, the solution of this task is, of course, interesting for marxist gnozeology and philosophy of science.