Publication Details

Abstract

The development of the scientific theory and the scientific research presupposes the existence of comprehensive philosophical-methodological conceptions that substantiate the general starting points of the cognition of objective reality and the basic principles of science. At the moment three comprehensive philosophical conceptions can be mentioned: the physicallst conception, the mentalist one and that of dialectical materialism. The first one, characterizing the positivist-scientistic orientation is built upon the principles of reductionism, epiphenomenolism and identity. It originated on the ground of the so called Vienna Circle and its contemporary forms are represented by W. V. Quine, J. J. C. Smart and others. The second, the mentalist conception is joined to the philosophical trend of so called neorationalism. K. R. Popper is its main representative. His theory of three worlds testifies this. The paper analyzes Popper’s conception and its application to the sphere of neurophysiology as sir John C. Eccles did it (in his work The Self and Its Brain, 1977). The author of the paper points out the confinement, the idealist foundation of both conceptions and confronts them with the philosophy of dialectical materialism which, on the contemporary level of development of science, presents the most adequate philosophical-methodological conception for research programmes in the sphere of science.