Publication Details

Abstract

Berlin’s division of liberty into its positive and negative variants is usually men-tioned as a point of reference in the debates about freedom. However, I consider as more fundamental the difference between liberal freedom and freedom based on responsible relations with other people and the surrounding world. In other words, I question the meaning of freedom, which - with a reference to the conception of Ladislav Hejdánek, proponent of the Czech practical philosophy – I do not consider to be an elimination of various life bonds, but instead their acceptance, fulfilment, or improvement. However, such binding freedom can also find its “allies” in liberalism – namely in the so-called liberalism of fear (B. Williams, J. Shklar), which is surprisingly close to Hejdánek’s conception and represents at least one of the contemporary currents of liberalism, able to unite with a seemingly opposing tradition. In addition to introducing Hejdánek’s conception of freedom, the aim of the paper is also to outline this connection.