Publication Details

Abstract

The idea of absolute principles of philosophy, independent of ontological presuppositions, is not realizable. The immediate certainty „cogito — sum“ and a logical evidence are two mutually excluding types of evidence. Descartes and Husserl artificially identified them. Descartes identified them directly and subordinated „cogito — sum“ to logical evidence. Husserl endeavored to constitute the logical from certainty of the type of „cogito — sum“. However, Husserl’s interpretation of non-actual horizons of „self“ as monadically implicated in actual immediateness, is built up by means of philosophical construction and not by means of an immediate given fact of the whole infinite area of transcendental subjectiveness. The assumption of the reliability of memory and the assumption that non-actual possibilities are monadically implicated in actual possibilities, is an unjustified ontological assumption, and Husserl’s phenomenology is built up on that unjustified ontological assumption. The original Descartes’ postulate of the absence of assumptions and Husserl’s effort for a starting point of pre-scientific immediate given facts are in an irreconciliable contradiction. From the viewpoint of Descartes’ idea of the absence of assumptions, the immediate flow of experiences has no gnoseological value. And since Husserl starts, on the contrary, from the viewpoint of immediate pre-scientific given facts, he cannot subject this „natural world“, even for a moment, to such a phenomenological reduction as it was in the case of scientific cognition. The idea of the absence of assumptions as well as the idea of absolute immediateness onesidedly absolutize the individual aspects of the progressive effort for a continuous dialectical self-negation of historically given presuppositions of thought and knowledge.