Publication Details
Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology and Descartes II
Abstract
The appearance of the transcendental motif in the history of philosophy is, so Husserl, related to the situation, in which the naive determination of the world became problematic. By the universal character of this motif we cast doubt on the world and also on the sciences, which examine it. Descartes, however, does not comprehend the object in its meaning; hence the main Husserl’s reproach against Descartes: instead of the meaning of the object Descartes sees in cogitatum a visual object. Husserl sees this „self-misinterpretation“ as Descartes’ misunderstanding of his own promising origins. This self-misinterpretation culminated in identifying ego, which Descartes discovered due to reduction, with I – the human being. Husserl made use of Descartes in transcendental phenomenology to justify the claim of phenomenology to be a universal strict science. Thus we get a picture of Descartes for phenomenology (Husserl’s Descartes), while the historical character of Descartes’ philosophy (Descartes’ Descartes) is diminishing. It is one of the deformations caused by Husserl’ effort to get foundation for a strictly and apodictically transcendental phenomenology. One of its victims was also Descartes’ philosophy, whose greatness is in being this victim.