Publication Details

Abstract

Michael Štaigel (1769—1829) became a member of the Malohontská literárna spoločnosť (Societas litteraria Kishontensis) chiefly owing to his pedagogical works. In the fifth annual tome of Solennia (of 1814), however, there was published also his essay Fragmentům syntheseos sensualium, in which he solved some questions of the theory of knowledge. Basing themselves on this essay historians of philosophy considered Štaigel a Slovak follower of Kant, moreover a thoroughly passive epigone, who didn’t add anything of his own to his master’s work. If we penetrate deeper into Štaigeľs work, we learn that this view is wrong. Štaigeľs essay shows definite marks of anti-kantianism. Instead of the principle of transcendentality the author puts the principle of direct cognition, he replaces Kant’s apriorism by consequent empirism, and proclaims as unrecognizeable anything not perceived by the organs of sense. The historians of philosophy were mistaken because of the kantianistic terminology, which this Slovak philosopher widely uses. The contents of his essay, however, give clear evidence that the meaning of his terminology greatly differs from that of Kant’s.