Publication Details

Abstract

In this study the relationship of logical sentential forms and analytical sentences to reality, and the genesis of analytical sentences and rules of proof are subjected to examination. The research is limited to the sentential calculus and predicate calculus of the first order. At the outset the way leading from concrete propositions to sentential forms is shown; the variables and constants of these forms are examined; the criterium is shown according to which logical constants are being distinguished from the specific ones, and it is demonstrated that the sentential forms are determined by general features of reality. Thus the sentential form „a is b“ is a reflection of the general circumstance according to which objects in the world always possess some properties, and therefore if we want to speak of the properties of a certain thing, we are to do so only by means of the said sentential form. The sentential form R (a,b, . . . . , n) reflects the general circumstance according to which objects appear in different relationship; owing to this fact forms of proposition are liable to adapt themselves to the given circumstance if they have to express relating situations. Since properties and relations do exist in reality, the said sentential forms are determined by the character of reality. If logical sentential forms are the reflection of certain aspects of reality, analytical sentences, too, (laws of logic) — should they be adequate to them — would reflect reality. To prove the truthfulness of this assertion concrete examples are presented in the study. The conclusive part of the work analyzes problems concerning the origin of analytical' sentences from originally empirical sentences of specific contents.