Publication Details

Abstract

Logical laws are normative postulates of logicalicity, intelligibility. Together with the other logical norms, they determine not the necessity of thinking in the natural sense, but the way how man is bound to think in order to have his way of thinking logically correct. Hence logics cannot be rigthfully considered as the grammar of thinking. However, respecting solely the criteria of correctness does not ensure the truthfulness of cognitions. Correctness is identical with truthfulness only as far as correctly deduced consequences are issuing from truthful premises. Truthfulness is the relation of cognition and object, while correctness is the reciprocal relation of logical forms in the sense of norms. Materialism — not recognizing any ideal, supranatural' region in the ontological sense was faced and is still faced with the task to illuminate the character of logics and its principles without mystification, to conceive thinking as an individual and social activity in its practical aims and consequences. The principles of logical thinking are to be considered as parallels of principles of a purposive activity, conscious of its aims. Logics are the logics of human thinking, and not of “thinking on the whole“. If there are experiments in Marxian philosophy to ontologize logics, so this fact can be seen as a consequence of Hegelianism. The negligence of specificity of logics and ontology, the identification of the sphere of logicalicity and objective law results eventually in antimaterialistic consequences. In the polemic against rationalism, occurring under different denominations, and its objectively-idealistic ontological outcome an important role was played in the interest of demystification by the the so-called antiintellectualist views. It was only political apriorism that had hampered Marxian philosophy to evaluate positively all the new and modern which had been brought about in the conception of logicalicity and logics.