Publication Details
Wittgenstein's Views of Ethics in the Middle and the Late Periods of his Philosophical Development
Abstract
In her analysis the author comes to the conclusion, that Wittgensteinś conception of ethics in the end of 1920s was marked by: 1. an ambiguous and confusing explanation of the term "ethics"; 2. continuously putting stress on fact/value difference as well as on the ethical being beyond the expression; 3. introducing the difference between the relative and the absolute (ethical) use of the words "good" and "right", "value" and differentiating between relative and absolute value judgments; 4. claiming the first person discourse as the only possible ethical discourse, The shift in Wittgensteinś views of ethics consists in that 1. Wittgenstein started to use the word "ethics" in its traditional meaning; 2. in his discussions of ethics he deals with moral problems of everyday life; 3. he makes his views on the absolute judgments´ being beyond expression more accurate; 4. he takes ethics as an theoretical system; 5. he sees ethics not as one doctrine, but rather as a whole consisting of several theoretical systems; 6. the influence of language game on ethical system becomes visible. Nevertheless, considering ethics in its traditional meaning did not depress his understanding of ethics as something higher, transcendent and God related.