Publication Details
Ontogenetic or Ontoprivative Ethiology of Evil? Considering the Origins of Evil
Abstract
The paper examins the origins of evil from two complementary points of view: systematic-structural, resp. ontic-ontological ones. From the first point of view evil is seen as the result of a system breaking due to which the system does not reach the expected level of development. The evil as such is then seen as the result of the ontic estrangement of its structures from their substantial basis. From the second point of view evil is conceived of as ontic privation (privatio) of an entity due to slowing down or interrupting of the expected evolutionary process. Moreover, evil as such, which can only be the characteristic of free human beings, means the ontological legitimation of this privacy. A human being, who by his fundamental choice negates the positive tendency of evolution, remains spiritually underdeveloped. It is his fault then that his spiritual and moral qualities do not correspond his possibilities. This destruction of his personality as his free choice is then the source of so called metaphysical evil.