Publication Details

Abstract

In the fourties of this century Hrušovský articulated his dialectical-strucrural conception of the world, which understood it as a complex nett of mutual structural relationships, influences and tensions. Hrušovský resolutely rejected the notion of substance and matter as a sort of foundation (absolute substance), i. e. ‘the orthodox, materialistic monism and substantialist elementarism. By "the level of substance" he meant a whole of differentiations (mutual effectiveness) and the contradictory dynamics of the object. During the seventies he fully recognized, that there is no object or subject "in itself', that there is always a contradictory interaction between them; he also came to understand the principial participation of the subject in creating the objective reality. Since that time his explanation of philosophical categories such as objective reality, materiality, subject, object and especially being (either objectivated, or undetermined, his so called "naked" being) was based on this recognition of this decisive role of cognitive-practical subject. Thus in his polemics against the representatives of dogmatic marxism in the seventies two ontological models of reality met head-on: substantialist-materialistic and nonsubstantialist-structural ones.