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The paper analyzes the concepts of truth and dialogue in the frame of current neutralist liberalism. According to neutral liberals, we should not introduce the concept of moral truth into the liberal dialogue, because currently we are unable to choose rationally the true moral claim among rival moral ideals. Rather, as Bruce Ackerman says, we should leave aside all moral ideals about which we currently disagree. However, resignation concerning the concept of truth in political discourse is not as unquestionable as liberals would like to proclaim. It is not even neutral. There are things which we cannot leave aside and still consider ourselves being morally neutral: for example, problems of abortion, euthanasia, cloning etc. Further, without the concept of truth we are unable to have a theory of human being, which we need in order to determine, who is allowed to take part in the political dialogue. Even though in the contemporary political theory the neutral liberalism is definitely an attractive solution, it has serious flaws, which we should not ignore neither in philosophical debate nor in the institutional designing of our societies.