Publication Details

Abstract

The paper discusses the appearing of the „inappearness“ of time. Does the time appear as a differentiation in the flow of the transcendental subjectivity, as Husserl believed? Or is the time to be referred to as the Heideggerian ek-statikon, excluding any intentionality, which is an inseparable part of Husserlian subject? In unveiling the time the author’s aim is to preserve and to unite both elements: the intentionality as well as the ek-stasy. The time is „incorporated“ into a fragmented intentionality with the traits of ek-stasy, which makes the seemingly incomprehensible play of retentions and protentions in the experience alive. The order of words as well as the meaning change: from now it is the comprehension of the timely character of all appearings or spectacles what matters, i.e. trying to grasp not the appearing of time, but rather the timing of the appearing. This method, which gives up searching for any ground, principle, origin or essence – of the time Itself – and is limited to appearing of the phenomenon is called minimalist phenomenology.