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Publication Details

Later Wittgenstein on Logical Rules

(Original title: Neskorý Wittgenstein o logických pravidlách)
Filozofia, 66 (2011), 2, 109-121.
Type of work: Papers
Publication language: Slovak

In his remarks from later period, Ludwig Wittgenstein is frequently concerned with so-called external roots of our logical operations. He asks questions like: ‘How is anything like logical necessity possible?‘; ‚How is possible anything like following a logical rule under normal circumstances?‘; ‚Where is the compelling force of a logical proof coming from?‘; etc. In the philosophical community, it is generally accepted that the later Wittgenstein’s remarks deal with these questions, but the philosophical motivation behind these remarks is still not clear. Instead, there is a growing disagreement among various interpretations over these remarks. The present consideration is built upon the belief that Wittgenstein’s remarks try to communicate a new sense to us. I argue that, contrary to the generally accepted view, there is a new and positive sense in these remarks. My aim in this paper is to clarify the philosophical motivation behind them.


Philosophy of logic, Conventionalism, Platonism, Modus tolens, Logical proof, Necessary truth, A posteriori

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