Publication Details

Abstract

The paper discusses selected problems, which have been elaborated by Igor Hrušovský during the first, basic period of his intellectual development 1930-1948. It shows Hrušovský's work as determined by the historical background, plurality of existing philosophical streams and by temporary favourable conditions, which made the integration, discussion and the assimilation of modem scientific thought posssible. The author outlines Hrušovský's specific way to his own theory of science, the logic and methodology of science, which have been remarkably influenced by logical empiricism. On the basis of his conception of scientific induction Hrušovský rejected extreme verificationism - his model of science was a confirmationist one. His understanding of basic propositions was antipsychological and antisubjectivist. The author outlines also the changes in his theory of science due to the shift of his attention on the problems of noetics.