Skočiť na hlavný obsah

Detail príspevku/publikácie

Kantova transcendentálna analytika

Filozofia, 29 (1974), 6, 606-613.
Typ článku: State a diskusie - 250. výročie narodenia Immanuela Kanta
Kant’s philosophy was not yet capable to use theoretically such an important means of changing “the thing-in-itself“ (dais Ding an sich) into “the thing for us“ as he social-human practice is. That is why “the thingin-itself“, according to Kant, is transcendent and thus not knowable to man. If “the thing-in-itself“, which according to Kant is chaotic and unshaped, is to become a concrete object, the a priori given and innate synthetic functions of the recognizing subject are inevitably necessary, he says. But we assert that being outside our consciousness is anti-chaotic, peratic. We do assert this because practice and cognition, within the limits of human abilities, continuously deepen. This peracity is manifested concretely in the processes of objectivization, i. e. in the processes of the dialectics of the objectivized being and of the theoretical- practical subject. The peracity of the being outside our consciousness conditions the evocation of practice and cognition. But a certain concrete order is already an object.
Súbor na stiahnutie: PDF