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Filozofia, 26 (1971), 4, 341-354.
Typ článku: State a diskusie
Abstrakt
The author in his paper denies the capability of reason to regulate human activity. According to him man is moved only by the irrational, first of all by instincts, and reason is at his employ. And as human instincts are dialectically contradictory, reason serves good and evil, depending on what interest orders it to recognize. Reason itself has no morale, it does not evaluate, it only recognizes. The fact that reason serves implies another fact that it; does not recognize objectively, impartially, but that it is a partisan of human interests, that is to say it recognizes more or less in order to match the interests that direct it. The extent of its partiallity depends on the measure of exactness of knowledge. In the exact natural sciences reason is much less partial than in the non-exact, abstract, speculative philosophy where the irrationalness of a philosopher can be applied to a great extent. Reason is most partial in the pre-scientific recognition of practical life, where it is sometimes openly directed by man’s egoism.
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