Detail príspevku/publikácie

Abstrakt

According to relativism about truth, there are certain kinds of sentences such that the propositions expressed by their utterances cannot be correctly determined as true or false relative to possible worlds only. In particular, the truth values of propositions about taste (i.e., those expressed by the utterances of sentences about taste) are supposed to be determined relative to possible world and perspective couples. What is important is that the proposition expressed involves no reference to perspective; as a result, the perspective that is to be used in the truth value assignment is not identified by the proposition expressed. Notwithstanding its considerable appeal in various respects, relativism about truth faces certain fundamental problems raised in this paper. It is claimed, firstly, that relativism about truth can hardly comply with our understanding of the predicates of taste in a satisfactory manner. Secondly, relativism about truth does not explain how it is possible that the propositions expressed, despite involving no reference to perspective whatsoever, are to be evaluated as true or false relative to some perspective or other. Thirdly, it is left unexplained how the right kind of perspective is to be selected provided there is no reference to perspective in the proposition expressed.