Publication Details

Abstract

Contemporary feminist debates often contrast Marxist-feminist social reproduction theory with intersectionality, portraying the former as additive and reductionist and the latter as constitutive and analytically superior. This paper reassesses this opposition. Drawing on Nira Yuval-Davis’s distinction between additive and constitutive approaches, it examines how selected representatives of both traditions conceptualize the ontological status and interrelations of class, gender, and race. The analysis focuses on Heidi Hartmann and Lise Vogel within social reproduction theory, and on Kimberlé Crenshaw, Patricia Hill Collins, Sylvia Walby, Jo Armstrong, and Sofie Strid within intersectional theory. It shows that neither tradition is internally uniform, as both oscillate between additive and constitutive logics. The paper argues that invoking mutual constitution does not in itself preclude additive reasoning and that the dichotomy has important limits. It concludes by proposing an integrated, mechanism-oriented framework of oppression.