Publication Details

Abstract

The semantic aspect o£ the coordination of words and propositions with the actual objects, and the aspects of syntactic correctness of proposition, together also the dialectical contradictiousness of both these aspects has been for more than four decades one of the complexes of questions which intensively attire a systematic and searching attention of scientificaly oriented philosophers working in the field of theory and methodology of sciences, in gnoseology and logic and last but not least also the attention of the theoretical physicist, biologist, linguist, etc. The structure of objective reality, its essential laws, functional relations and tensions are in the dialectics of present time scientific cognition perceived through increasingly perfectioned theoretical models, and fixed in increasingly pertinent conceptional transpositions. The impulse for the transformation of scientific theories always issues from the experimental and practically-empirical field, from newly obtained results of scientific research which cannot be any more explained by the actually valid theories. True, the theoretical structure indicates the direction of scientific research; on the other hand, however, new experimental findings gradually call for its reorganisation. Whenever certain specific theoretical aggregates call for a certain systematism, they can be made axiomatic. The authority of any axiomatized system cannot last for ever but can last only as long as the semantic intervention springing from new results of concrete scientific research does not call for the reorganisation of the theoretical system and its axioms. This is apparently a dialectical relationship of two basical aspects where in the scientific development we once dedicate ourselves to the syntactic fixation and integration of the given cognitional structure, another time however we are concerned with its reconstruction, compelled to do so owing to the existence of new concrete knowledge. The conceptional, and generally the cognitional denotation and coherence are two dialectically related basical aspects in the process of development of scientific cognition. Inasmuch as we are concerned with the difference between facticity (it has a hypothetical character), and the syntactic inevitability (it is apodictic), that is as far as the point in question is the difference between empiricality and analyticality, the following can be said: we proceed with the axiomatization of specific empirical theoretical aggregates always only when these aggregates are empirically adequately founded. The act of axiomatization or codification itself causes the given system of empirical propositions to become a system of analytical propositions. It goes without saying that the laws of scientific development will stage by stage require the suspension (semantic intervention) of the analytical character of the given axiomatized system of propositions, and call us to accede to its reconstruction.