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A fruitful ontological analysis of the theory of reflection must atempt to solve the problem of consciousness; providing we approach the theory of reflection by means of the objective concept of object and subject without distinguishing the phenomenal and transphenomenal world we cannot analyse the starting point of the theory of reflection satisfactorily either. The starting point of the theory of reflection creates a discrepancy between the scientific finding that consiousness is a function of the central nerve system and the fact that consciousness has no immediate data about its dependence on and continuity with the central nerve system. This discrepancy may be overcome only properly elaborate the assumption, pronounced also by Lenin, that reflections of the world exist in us. Hence the distinction between the phenomenal and transphenomenal world result too from Lenin’s elaboration of scientific findings. The ontological analysis of perception reveals the elements of image and that of signs, hence the identical as well as nonidentical with anoriginal reality. Providing we are compelled to admit ahat the time relations are imagined in our perception and that we concieve time as an ideal entity (supposing that we concieve space and time as the dialectically limited empirical categories, while inferring the ideological contradiction between the material and ideal from the contradiction between space and time) thereby we must also atribute the ideal nature to concsiousness. The conception of the dialectical unity of the material and ideal may be traced in Lenin’s essays as well. The fact that the objective ideal entities are immediately reflected in consciousness that is an ideal entity does not imply that sentiments also are of the objective ideal nature. They are but signs of reality and exist only in the subject due to the fact that they generate by the qualitative change of objective influence upon the sensory organs of a subject.