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Astronautka Astrid a jej úbohá mačka (Niekoľko poznámok k teórii nepriamych záväzkov voči zvieratám)

Filozofia, 68 (2013), 4, 332-342.
Typ článku: Úvahy - eseje

Our moral feelings enable us to extend moral considerations to nonhuman sensitive beings, no matter if they are rational agents, have moral concepts etc. or not. The question, however, is: Are we willing to sacrifice a part of our interests in favor of more serious interests or needs of nonhumans? The paper offers a critical reconsideration of the basic assumptions of the theory of “indirect moral status”. Unlike Peter Carruthers’s theory I argue that nonhuman sentient beings are directly morally considerable.

Kľúčové slová

Animal ethics, Equal consideration of interests, Feeling pain, Indirect moral duties, Marginal cases, Meat-eating, Nonhumans, Suffering

Súbor na stiahnutie: PDF