Publication Details

Abstract

The latest physical theories, especially quantum mechanics, are characterized by the majority of physicists as imperceivable by senses. The concept of sensory perceptibility of a theory is not sharp enough; most authors, however, assent to the standpoint that in this context sensory perceptibility cannot be identified with vivid insight. Sensory perceptibility of a theory is judged on the basis of its relation to the sensory degree of knowledge. In the pre-Renaissance image of the world, the model of the objects of the outer world was perceivable by senses and the explanation of the relations between them was laden with anthropomorphism. In classical physics, the objects of physical investigation remained perceivable by senses, but the relations between them were increasingly losing this quality. Contemporary quantum physics does not give even a picture of the physical objects proper which would be perceptible by senses. Such a picture cannot be deduced either from the experiments on microobjects, whose results are perceivable by senses, or from the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics. However, immaterialness cannot be deduced from sensory imperceptibility. The contemporary materialistic philosophy cannot, however, manage with the category of substance and passes from the reistic conception of reality to a structural one.