Publication Details

Abstract

Many transhumanists hope near-future developments in various medical and engineering fields will eventually lead to the end of human mortality. There are numerous practical obstacles, moral conundrums, and conceptual issues here that must be addressed, but a more fundamental problem for visions of something approximating immortality concerns the enthusiasm for these visions itself. Even if it were possible to extend human lives indefinitely, are lives that last (potentially) forever really worth wanting? We consider some key arguments in what has come to be known as the “desirability of immortality” debate. The arguments of greatest interest are those focusing on the relationship between time and value. After briefly sketching them out, we contrast them with Henri Bergson’s account of time as duration. When one relies on Bergson, and related ideas in Martin Heidegger’s work, it becomes clear that the absence of death need not render an immortal life meaningless, as some philosophers believe.