Publication Details

Abstract

The paper deals with the analysis and criticism of the philosophical conception of the founder and significant representative of operationalist philosophy Anatol Rapcupont. The author points out at the subjective-idealistic character of operationalism. Also Rapoport’s conception builds on the starting-points of the classical subjective idealism of Berkeley’s and Hume’s type and connects them with the development of science. The author polemizes with his conception of man, 'science and rational analysis, as the only correct scientific method. Rapoport denounces dialectics, in both its idealistic and Marxist shape, as inimical to science and as a method of suppressing man’s creative powers, first of all of the mental capacities of intelligentsia. He concentrates his attacks namely against the elementary category of dialectics — the contradiction, which he conceives purely subjectively. Allegedly it should be excluded, as it is a mark of defective thinking. Rapoport wants to realize this by broadening “the relative systems” so that they should be capable of accepting the mutually exclusive, contradictory experiences of man. Against the philosophical and methodological conception of contradiction he applies ithe idea of complementariness. The author points out the most important aspects of ideologically integrating function of operationalist philosophy.