Publication Details

Abstract

More and more bourgeois philosophers and scientists studying the methodology of scientific cognition, begin to comprehend the inevitability of applying the dialectical view on the development of scientific cognition. The representatives of neorationalism, an influential though barely investigated current of philosophy of science, belong evidently among them. The present paper analyzes the dialectical elements in 'the conceptions of the most important representatives of the neorationalist philosophy of science — in the conception of epistemological prophiles of G. Bachelard, in the genetic structuralism of J. Piaget and namely in the open methodology of F. Gonseth. The neorationalistic conception of the development of scientific cognition, of relative and absolute truth, of the relation of the theoretical and the empirical, of the relation of formal and experimental sciences, undoubtedly contains dialectical elements. The neorationalists accept the dialectics of scientific cognition (subjective dialectics). But they ignore the problem of the dialectics of the objective world. Insufficient attention is paid also to such a relevant question as the problem of contradiction is. And if they are urged to notice also this principle, they replace it actually with the principle of complementarity.