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The problem of the relation of Heidegger’s philosophy to humanism was and remains a problem indipendently of Heidegger's participation in the present discussion on the nature and aims of modern humanism, because the “fundamental ontology“ as the main contribution of this philosophy presupposes and implies in its ontocentrism fundamental changes in anthropological positions, which mean a decisive and far-reaching separation with humanistic positions of the traditional bourgeois anthropology. Considering that Heidegger formed his anthropological and ethico-political views more precisely in the post-war atmosphere of general discredit of antihumanistic views, he also failed to avoid, in spite of his evident aversion, an outer moderation of the ontocentric antihumanism following from his ontology. Thus, Heidegger also succumbed to the power of the humanistic and pseudo-humanistic current and completed the antihumanistic contents of his anthropology by a “humanistic“ ideological form by declaring it to be a starting point of a “new humanism“ and a resolute adversary' of any “inhumanism“. However, an analysis of Heidegger's anthropology shows man to be interpreted there in a distorted and extremely narrow way just because man is subordinated ontologically and axiologically to an outer extrahuman entity — speculatively constituted “being“. That is why Heidegger’s anthropology does not take as a starting point the autonomy of human needs and interests when formulating its requirements to man, but from alienated needs and interests as deduced from the “being“ as an ultimate value. In order to be able to designate such a heterocentric anthropology as humanism, Heidegger has to define the concept itself of humanism in a new way. Thus, as a by-product of the ideal criticism of humanism, an entirely new interpretation of humanism emerges as an axiologically formal and neutral philosophical category. In this alienation of the concept of humanism to its original meaning the fact finds outer expression and semantic confirmation that Heidegger’s “new humanism“ in not a real humanism but only a pseudo-humanistically moderated form of restoration of irrational traditions of German antihumanism.