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Svedomie ako „iné v tom istom“. Ricœur, Levinas: Dve odlišné neepistemologické perspektívy

Filozofia, 65 (2010), 9, 845-859.
Typ článku: State

The essay compares Ricœur’s and Levinas’s conceptions of the constitution of conscience in the sense of German Gewissen. Beginning with Ricœur’s basic distinction between “identity-idem” and “identity-ipse” it shows the proper place of conscience in his conception. For Ricœur conscience is a finite category of otherness as related to the self, i.e. its most interior, intrinsic otherness. For Levinas, on the other hand, conscience – the other in the same – is an initiatory category, which is described in terms of absolute passivity, persecution and substitution. In conclusion Ricœur´s critique of Levinas’ category of “the Other” is examined on the background of Levinas’ conception of subjectivity as a vocation for Good.

Kľúčové slová

Subjectivity, Identity, Conscience, Other in the Same, Passivity, Ethics, Good

Súbor na stiahnutie: PDF