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K interpretácii Moorovej protiskeptickej filozofie

Filozofia, 65 (2010), 1, 74-82.
Typ článku: Mladá filozofia

G. E. Moore replies to skepticism by using propositions which from the common sense perspective are trivially true. However, it seems that his replies are not effective, because the skeptic’s doubts concern precisely the common sense truths. This problem became the subject of various interpretations. N. Malcolm and B. Stroud suggest that Moore is not trying to refute skepticism directly (he would not have been successful and it is not probable that he would have overlooked such a ‘fatal’ error). Therefore, they look for an alternative interpretation of Moore’s replies. They find the ground of their effectiveness in his pointing to the use of words, as well as in the illegitimacy of the skeptic’s position. The author offers an interpretation in the terms of reliabilism, which avoids the defects of the previous ones and does not require an alternative understanding of Moore’s propositions: Moore insists on the reliability of perception what enables him to yield effective replies to skepticism in agreement with common sense.

Kľúčové slová

Skepticism, Common sense, Reliabilism

Súbor na stiahnutie: PDF