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The Aristotelian distinction between technical and moral reason, production and interaction permeates Habermas’s thought. But in moral theory, Habermas’s main emphasis is on the decontextualized justification of moral norms, while Aristotle’s focus is on contextualized judgment. The paper argues that Aristotle’s theory of practical wisdom could be instructive for discourse ethics. Habermas has not been open to this possibility because he has appropriated the neo-Aristotelian interpretation of Aristotle, in which practical wisdom is subordinated to traditional norms, an interpretation that neglects the role of reason in moral deliberation. Moreover, the contemporary ethos is impregnated with universal moral demands which, it is supposed, should guide our moral judgments. It is further argued that there are elements in Habermas’s theory of moral and social development which can serve a role comparable to that of teleology in Aristotle. The paper maintains that a possible way to strengthen discourse ethics by incorporating practical wisdom is to tease out the implications of the fact that both Habermas and Aristotle build their views on the human capacity for speech and reasoning.