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In the article “Frege’s Der Gedanke as a Rival Project to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus ,” we considered the question of the explication of the concepts of fact and world to be the key difference between these projects. Tichý proposed reconciling the two by reinterpreting Wittgenstein’s complexes as abstract procedures that rely on the modal concept of the bare individual. Russell’s misunderstanding of Frege’s distinction between the sense and denotation of an expression significantly influenced Wittgenstein. Tichý’s concept of an abstract procedure closely resembles Frege’s concept of compound thought. We supplement Tichý’s explanation of the concept of the bare individual by distinguishing between two suppositions of proper names, de dicto and de re. This distinction brings us closer to Frege’s own distinction between the sense and denotation of proper names. Finally, we present an explanation that the core of the semantic error of logical atomism is the assumed tropism.