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Publication Details

Intentionality: Traditional Dichotomies in the Philosophy of Language and Mind and Wittgenstein's Intemalistic Strategy of Their Resolution

(Original title: Intencionalita: tradičné dichotómie vo filozofii jazyka a mysle a Wittgensteinova itemalistická stratégia ich prekonania)
Filozofia, 52 (1997), 2, 81-88.
Type of work: Papers
Publication language: Slovak

The paper examines Wittgenstein's approach to intentionality in his Philosophical Investigations and Philosophical Grammar. Wittgenstein's criticism of "Bedeutungskörper", the shadow object is outlined. The presence of the latter makes dead signs and sounds meaningful!. It is showed, how this criticism was applied to the sphere of mind with its mentalistic variations of the concept of Bedeutungskörper. Attention is paid to Wittgenstein's refusal of external relationships between language and reality and to his introduction of a purely intemalistic explanation based on grammatical substitutions, by which no mediating mechanisms are necessary. The author outlines also the resolution of the paradox of the presence and absence of a state of affairs, which either still does not exist, or will never exist at all.

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