Publication Details

Abstract

The paper deals with Wittgenstein's articulation of the internal, subjective, which is called "the soul" by the author. She questions the behavioristic interpretation of Wittgenstein's conception of the internal, trying to show, how his conception of the unutterable from Tractatus still persists in Philosophical Investigations. She argues further that Wittgenstein's conception of language games contradicts his own picture of soul. She maintains at the same time, that his ontology of soul concerns "something really existing", which nature we are unable to grasp. On her view Wittgenstein's notion of the philosophical inquiry makes the criticism of the mental/physical analogy and the attempts to get rid of the old philosophical problem in general sensless. Either the text of Philosophical Investigations becomes sensless due to "the misunderstanding of the logic of our language", or Wittgenstein's language game is one among others, providing thus one more evidence for the fact, that philosophical problems - and the problem of soul in particual - can not be eliminated.