Publication Details

Abstract

In his works Pavel Tichý relied on the concept of the empirically bare individual, which was based on the denial of empirical omniscience. A critical discussion developed among his followers, in which various proposals were put forward: bare individuals do not exist; instead, they are a concept, a construct, or a property. In 1991, Robert Stalnaker, in his critique of anti-essentialism, came up with the concept of analytical essentialism. The identity of the individual and its cognition remained a neuralgic point. We propose the hypothesis that if we reject the assumption of analytical omniscience, a non-contradictory solution is to distinguish between completely bare individuals as bearers of identity on the one hand and space-time particulars on the other, which are rich in properties. Complete anti-essentialism applies to individuals, and partial essentialism with the application of supplementary conventions relating to their empirical identity applies to their counterparts – particulars.