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Connecting the categories of object and subject with the „active principle“ in marxist philosophy and constituting them as historico-materialistic categories, must, of necessity, become manifest in a differentiation of the significations of their adjectival forms. If we are to take seriously Lenin’s idea that contradiction between the materialistic and the idealist is absolutely contradictory only within the limits of the basic philosophical question, then we have to differentiate between at least three meanings of objective and subjective categories. In the plane of the basic philosophical question, both the categories appear as synonymous of materialist and idealist philosophy (1). In the plane of „knowledgeability or non-knowledgeability“ of the world, objective category marks an adequate form and subjective category an approximative form of the reflection of reality in our knowledge (2). In the plane of historico-materialistic analysis, subjective category marks the relevant activity of a real historical subject, mediated always by a certain degree of its selfconsciousness, while objective category marks all that makes this activity possible, that serves as its basis and its starting point, and all that obstructs and confines it: these conditions are found both within and without the subject, while it is not possible to reduce them solely down to their most important component, i. e. economical and material conditions (3). Gnoseological significatiens of objective and subjective categories (1 and 2) preserve in their domain an unconditional validity. Reduction of an ontological, historicomaterialistic signification of both the categories to their gnoseological meaning leads to the loss of a firm methodological position and to a violation of the materialistic monism (theory of objective and subjective factors).