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The author argues against the opinion that the early philosophy of Wittgenstein represents transcendental philosophy. He analyzes Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and his Notebooks 1914 to 1916 and concludes: 1. the early philosophy of Wittgenstein is not transcendental as it aims programmatically at the exclusion of subjectivity from philosophy; 2. it is not transcendental as it refuses clearly the possibility of synthetic apriorism; 3. early Wittgenstein’s philosophy is not transcentental as it prevents installing and analyzing of dialectical relation between the subject and the object (mediation); 4. eariy Wittgenstein’s philosophy must be to be considered the example of platonizing objectivist panlogism with conspicuous features of linguistic mysticism. In the second part of the paper the author supports his conclusions by the analysis of the relation of early Wittgenstein’s philosophy to attitudes of H. Hertz and E. Mach and he demonstrates that early Wittgenstein’s philosophy was close to anti-Machist opinions. Wittgenstein was inspired by Hertz’s metatheory, nevertheless he did not draw any theses of transcendental philosophy from these sources. The author considers the problem of evaluation of philosophy from the standpoint of transcendentalism to be one of the criteria of progressivity of post-Kantian and post-Marxist bourgeois philosophy.