Detail príspevku/publikácie
Neriešiteľný problém univerzalizmu v Tugendhatovej antropológii
Abstrakt
The article draws on Tugendhat’s idea of the twofold character of truth resulting from the twofold structure of self-conciousnes. When asking the question Who is a person? there is always our implicit self-evidence present. And from Kant on we also ask explicit questions, such as How do we want to understand ourselves? and What is better for us? This articulation of the problem – a product of Enlightenment – involves a rejection of the traditionally shared truth about a person. Therefore, Tugendhat’s project includes the transformation of an implicitly valid universe of meaning into explicitly justified positions. Wittgenstein’s arguing that when thematizing the limits of language we can not transcend these limits is used to show that Tugendhat’s efforts to explicitly articulate the universal structure of understanding of the concept of a human being as a whole does have its implicitly shared cultural determinations, too.
Language, Negatability, Propositional attitude, Understanding of being as a whole