Publication Details

Abstract

In this paper I shall explore how self-fashioning, as conceived by Friedrich Nietzsche, is possible. My goal is to show that self-fashioning is not jeopardized by Nietzsche’s determinism and his rejection of traditional ideas of selfhood, agency, and freedom. First, I shall clarify why the abandonment of this traditional conception of human beings is seen by some as deleterious to the project of self-fashioning. Afterwards, I shall argue that Nietzsche is a determinist: he maintains that one could not have acted otherwise. If thought of in this way, freedom is impossible. However, Nietzsche also has a more positive conception of freedom. Following John Richardson’s reading of Nietzsche, I shall examine the three main stages through which freedom evolves. I shall expand Richardson‘s account with a corresponding analysis of Nietzsche’s notion of responsibility. Finally, we shall see how a discussion of such issues allows us to understand how self-fashioning is possible.