Publication Details

Abstract

Out of divergent answers to the question of the obligatoriness of the moral action three different ethic conceptions (deontologism, consequentialism and the ethics of virtue) developed, which define themselves as incompatible or opposite. Contrary to this attitude the author argues, that the posession of certain virtues is inseparable from moral choice and action, regardless to subjectś prefference of the deontological or consequentialist perspective. Her idea is, that neither the imperative of the obedience to the duty nor the responsibility for the consequencies of oneś action does not operate independently and against the moral conviction of the subject. First, she defines the concept of duty and its importance for moral action as articulated in the respective conceptions. Further she attempts to show, that the deontologism does not reject the concept of virtue itself. It is rather its reinterpretation making the moral rules the standards of judging the action, which is questionable. In conclusion she tries to explain, how important the virtues are for doing good, by justifying the coexistnce of virtue and happiness.