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Abstrakt

G. E. M. Anscombe famously argues that our self-knowledge of intentional action (“practical knowledge”) is both non-observational and yet concerns happenings in objective reality. This combination seems to present a strong tension. Recently, Adrian Haddock offered a novel account of the role of observation in practical knowledge, claiming that such knowledge is a unity of self-knowledge (non-observational) and other-knowledge (observational), both of which are indispensable. Yet Haddock’s view faces several problems. This paper suggests that Sartre’s phenomenology resonates deeply with Haddock’s account and provides a rich resource for addressing his problems. Through Sartre’s discussions of self-consciousness, intentionality, and perception-action unity, we gain a deeper understanding of how observation functions within practical knowledge. This account shows that observation is not merely an aid (as Anscombe suggests) but a constitutive part of practical knowledge.