Volume 81 (2026), 3
State
Filozofia, 81 (2026), 3, 277 - 293.
Abstrakt
According to a Subjectivist theory of X, reference to belief in the existence of X enters essentially into a full account of what the existence of X consists in. A Subjectivist theory doesn’t claim that X is a ‘merely subjective’ phenomenon; it’s a theory of what the existence of X consists in as a matter of objective fact. A Commitment theory of X is a theory of X… Čítať ďalej
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Filozofia, 81 (2026), 3, 294 - 308.
Abstrakt
G. E. M. Anscombe famously argues that our self-knowledge of intentional action (“practical knowledge”) is both non-observational and yet concerns happenings in objective reality. This combination seems to present a strong tension. Recently, Adrian Haddock offered a novel account of the role of observation in practical knowledge, claiming that such knowledge is a… Čítať ďalej
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